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Impact of Investments in Special Economic Zones on Regional 
Development: The Case of Poland 
Abstract  
Special economic zones in Poland (SEZs) were established to explicitly enhance 
regional development, crafting a series of investment incentives designed to boost 
investment attractiveness in particular regions. How have these incentives fared 
in reality? To capture the impact of SEZs upon regional development in the 
country, we use a counterfactual evaluation method across a number of important 
metrics, including company investment, number of companies, and 
unemployment. Our analysis shows that SEZs have had a strongly positive 
impact upon the development of the least-developed regions in Poland, while in 
relatively richer ones the effect was weak or even negative. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1994, with an eye on encouraging investment, fourteen special economic zones 
(SEZs) were established in the least-developed regions in Poland. As stipulated in the 
Act on Special Economic Zones (1994), the goal of these SEZs was to enhance social 
and economic development and the competitiveness of regions affected by industrial 
restructuring at the beginning of political and economic transformations of the 1990s. In 
particular, the zones were designed to develop new technologies, create new jobs, 
develop exports, and utilize and improve existing infrastructure in the “uninhabited” 
area of a particular region. In pursuit of these lofty goals, potential investors were 
offered special state aid and income tax allowances to lure them into these new zones. 
Representing the major economic policy instrument dedicated to regional development, 
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SEZs have remained the cornerstone of regional economic policy in Poland over the 
past 20 years. 
The primary aim of this paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of these SEZs in 
meeting their objectives across the metrics specified in the original legislation. Utilizing 
the framework of New Economic Geography (NEG) theory and in particular ideas on 
economic agglomeration, one would expect to see SEZs encouraging the growth of 
existing businesses and the emergence of start-ups in regions of Poland with SEZs, as 
well as an inflow of investors to these territories. Furthermore, greater involvement of 
manufacturing and service businesses in regions with SEZs, harmed in the transition to 
a market economy, should increase the demand for labour and, consequently, stimulate 
local labour markets. Much as the framers of the Act hoped, we would anticipate the 
total effect of special economic zones in Poland to improve the social and economic 
development of the regions they were based in (Diagram 1). 
 
Diagram 1. SEZs impact mechanism. 
 
(file: Diagram 1. SEZs impact mechanism.tiff) 
 
Using a counterfactual evaluation method, our results show that SEZs have been 
effective in some ways in achieving their goals, but in a manner likely unanticipated in 
1994. While SEZs appear to have increased jobs available in a particular region and 
increased the gross value-added of specific firms, new firm entry has been 
indistinguishable in regions with SEZs from those without. It appears that, rather than 
creating broad-based regional development, Poland’s SEZs have benefited a small 
number of larger firms.  
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in the next section, we discuss the 
theoretical basis to analyse agglomeration effects of SEZs in Poland. In the third 
section, we examine the theoretical basis and anticipated effects of SEZs, based on prior 
research. Section four describes our research methodology and data, while the fifth 
section discusses the empirical results. The final section offers some concluding 
thoughts.  
 
SEZS IN POLAND: STYLISED FACTS 
As noted above, the overarching goal of the state aid administered via SEZs in Poland 
was to address a geographic imbalance in investment distribution across the country, 
boosting the then-low investment attractiveness of the poorest areas of Poland 
(Ambroziak, 2009). As with SEZs around the world, the model chosen by Poland was 
distinctly different from export processing zones (EPZs), a policy tool in countries 
which shifted from import-substitution policies to export-led growth policies and which 
was specialised mainly in manufacturing for export. While EPZs provided a package of 
financial incentives, streamlined business administration, free trade advantages, and a 
liberal regulatory environment solely to exporters (World Bank, 1992:7, Engman et al., 
2007:5), SEZs offered similar incentives but to all industries. Rather than focusing on 
outward-orientation (exports), the SEZ model attempts to solicit inward investment, 
enhancing the competitiveness of manufacturing industries and service providers 
through agglomeration benefits, concentrating industries in one geographical area. In 
practice, as done in Poland, SEZ locations are often restricted to relatively remote areas 
to act as growth poles for regional development (World Bank, 2008:12); in this manner, 
SEZs would change incentives at the margin, encouraging entrepreneurs to undertake 
economic activity which would not have existed in the absence of such aid. For the 
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poorest regions of a country, SEZs could be expected to overcome barriers common to 
underdeveloped areas, including poor infrastructure and unskilled labour.  
Poland’s SEZ model was structured to accommodate the process of EU 
accession, which the country officially began in February 1994 (the Association 
Agreement was signed in 1991 but came into force three years later). As written in the 
1994 Act, Polish SEZs were compliant with EU rules for state aid admissibility in cases 
of “market imperfection” (European Commission, 2005), as special EU guidelines on 
regional state aid allowed for granting public subsidies to companies to promote the 
expansion and diversification of economic activities pursued in least-favoured regions 
(identified as those where GDP per capita is below 75% of the EU average, European 
Commission, 1998, 2006).  
Despite the intention of EU rules to allow state aid for specifically-designated 
and disadvantaged regions within a country, Poland’s interpretation was more 
expansive. Poland, as one of the least developed Member States, appeared to have carte 
blance to provide regional state aid (also within the framework of SEZs) to businesses 
based on its territory, with only variety in intensity ceilings. This view meant that that 
SEZs were not only targeted at the country’s poorest regions, but instead expanded and 
fragmented across the entire country. What transpired was, guided by the suggestions of 
potential investors, the government adopted a rather flexible stance towards the 
boundaries of SEZs, showing a readiness to adapt them to investor needs rather than as 
part of a regional development strategy.  
This approach necessarily subverted the original aim of the SEZ: in particular, 
entrepreneurs, especially foreign ones, had been seeking to locate their investment 
projects in Poland close to their competitors and/or transport infrastructure, meaning 
they had an incentive to choose better-developed areas and disregard regions lagging 
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behind (Cieślik, 2005, Laskowski, 2013, Nazarczuk, 2013). As part of an overall 
strategy to encourage investment, the government also excluded regions least-prepared 
for investment as candidates for SEZs, replacing them with better-developed ones 
(Ordinance, 2008, Ambroziak, 2009). As a result, by the end of 2013, SEZs could be 
found in 151 cities and 217 gminas (NUTS V administrative unit in Poland) hosting 
“subzones” of fourteen SEZs (Ministerstwo Gospodarki, 2014). 
 
ANTICIPATED EFFECTS OF POLAND’S SEZS 
The effects of the Polish approach to SEZs may be analysed in the light of the 
agglomeration process predicted in New Economic Geography (NEG) theory. As noted 
by Krugman (1990), one of the fundamental assumptions of NEG is that a myriad of 
factors (increasing returns to scale due to new knowledge spill-over effects, demand 
generated by the domestic market, or costs of trade in the context of Weber’s theory 
(Weber, 1929) on location of industries based on the ‘least cost principle’ and a role of 
transportation costs can explain the agglomeration (concentration) of industry in better-
developed regions of a country (Krugman, 1991; Venables, 2006). Of these factors, 
increasing returns to scale may be the most important in generating agglomerations of 
economic activity in a region where capital and labour are abundant (Fujita et al., 1999). 
Incitement to agglomerate may also come from other aspects of the business 
environment beyond mere factor endowments, including improved technical conditions 
and the emerging prospect of collaboration with other entrepreneurs, universities and 
research centres (Rosenthal and Strange, 2001). Improved governance in the form of 
local authorities may also play a role (Dziemianowicz, 2008, Lizińska, Marks-Bielska 
and Kisiel, 2011).  
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Given the tendency towards agglomeration and the stylised facts surrounding 
Poland’s experiences with SEZs, we may then formulate three separate hypotheses 
regarding the effects of SEZs in Poland: 
 
• H1: the inflow of capital into a SEZ in a given region of Poland should be 
accompanied by the interest of other investors, which results in an increase of gross 
value of fixed assets per company in a given region; 
 
As noted above, the Polish approach to the establishment of SEZs was to place 
them in more developed regions, near relatively better developed industrial-service-
research centres, close to already existing companies and along well-advanced 
transportation routes (Ambroziak, 2009). Given this reality, we would expect to see 
companies which did locate in the SEZs to fare rather well compared to those outside 
the SEZs, as they would be advantaged by tax allowances and breaks in addition to 
existing advantages.   
 
• H2: the inflow of capital into a SEZ in a given region would be accompanied by an 
overall increase in the number of business entities (co-operators, suppliers and 
business customers at a regional level); 
• H3: investment inflow into a SEZ increases the number of new jobs and therefore 
reduces the unemployment rate in a given region. 
 
These final two hypotheses build on agglomeration theory to suggest that Poland’s 
SEZs would not only attract new entrants to the zones but also benefit existing firms. 
Moreover, economic activity and investment into regions with SEZs should have 
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increased, building on the natural advantages of the selected regions and the incentives 
offered by the government.  
 
A common problem of lagging regions is their inability to utilize factors already present 
on their territory. The establishment of a SEZ in a given region and the arrival of new 
investors with new technologies and new production processes should theoretically lead 
to gains, as previously unused factors available in the region are brought on-line. In 
such a scenario, there should be a boom of local and incoming entrepreneurship, the 
creation of inter-business linkages between local and new companies, and, 
consequently, the reduction of unemployment through the creation of new and better 
jobs. It is expected that all of the aforementioned processes launched by market 
mechanisms can be strengthened by public intervention in the form of (inter alia) 
establishment of SEZs. However, it should be underlined that each public intervention 
can also have many negative consequences for competition (Ambroziak, 2015a). 
Nevertheless, we expect an increase in number of economic entities and a decrease in 
unemployment rate in poviats with SEZs. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In order to test our three hypotheses, our examination will apply a counterfactual impact 
evaluation of economic and social consequences of all the subzones of the fourteen 
SEZs on regional development. A fundamental problem with causal inference is the 
impossibility to observe one and the same object in two situations: i.e. with and without 
the intervention (Holland, 1986: 945). To address this issue and to ensure 
methodological rigour, our approach to understanding the effect of SEZs in Poland will 
compare what actually happened in the subzones in question with what would have 
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happened in the absence of an SEZ (White, 2006:3) across several metrics, including 
gross value of fixed assets per company, the number of entrepreneurs in a region, and 
unemployment rates. To construct the counterfactual, we needed to identify a ‘perfect 
clone’ for each region and beneficiary of the intervention (i.e. of the SEZ). However, 
due to the fact that no perfect clone exists for a single individual region, two groups had 
to be identified: beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of intervention, identical in all 
pertinent aspects except for the treatment effect of the intervention. Consequently, only 
the intervention could explain any differences in outcomes between the two groups once 
the intervention has been introduced (Baker, 2000:1, Gertler et al. 2011:37). Differences 
observed in changes in gross value of fixed assets per company, the number of 
entrepreneurs, and unemployment rates in the experimental group (poviats with SEZs) 
compared to the changes in the control group (poviats without SEZs) in the period of 
2005-2013 were interpreted as SEZ impact on regional development 
For our analysis, we established an experimental (treatment) group composed 
of all regions with SEZs and a control (comparison) group of the rest of regions in 
Poland without any SEZs. However, an issue encountered in previous studies is that 
they often showed effects of economic activities in SEZs broken down by the fourteen 
SEZs (identified with names of fourteen state-owned companies responsible for 
administering SEZs in Poland) (Dziemianowicz, Hausner and Szlachta 2000, Kryńska 
2000, Domański and Gwosdz 2005, Kozaczka, 2007, 2008, Pastusiak, 2011, Laskowski 
2013, Siudak 2013, Typa 2013, Hajduga, 2014). Due to the above-mentioned frequent 
changes in SEZs borders introduced by the government in response to potential 
investors’ requests, SEZs are heavily fragmented. Thus, in Poland, the names of the 
state-owned companies which manage SEZs do not necessarily overlap with geographic 
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names of the real locations of SEZ subzones and, consequently, some conclusions on 
the impact of SEZs upon regions can be misinterpreted. 
In order to overcome this problem, it is preferable to observe changes in 
economic activity at the level of poviats, one of the tiers of territorial statistics, 
equivalent of NUTS 4, which remains in the middle of NUTS classification. On the one 
hand, previous work suggests that companies in SEZs attracted workers and suppliers 
from gminas (territorial units at the lowest tier of administrative structure in Poland – 
NUTS 5) and poviats, in which they are based or from neighbouring areas (Ambroziak, 
2009). On the other hand, other studies have captured the impact of SEZs upon social 
and economic development of bigger regions, such as voivodeships (NUTS 2) 
(Ambroziak, 2015b). 
With the territorial boundaries established, the next step is to select poviats for 
the experimental and control groups which are statistically equivalent, i.e.: a) identically 
respond to intervention; b) be identically influenced by other external factors and 
interventions; and c) be identical when it comes to their characteristics in terms of 
important demographic and economic data. Due to the fact that all central government 
tools apply to all poviats across the board, the only differences in their responses to the 
presence of an SEZ and thus in their socio-economic performance may result from (i) 
being part of a particular voivodeship (which determines admissible regional state aid 
available in, inter alia, SEZs); and (ii) unequal advancement of regional development. 
In both cases we are speaking of factors relevant for the interest of business operators in 
investing in a given area, including in an SEZ. In order to eliminate differences between 
the experimental and control groups of poviats caused by differences in external factors 
that influence their investment attractiveness, we distinguished subgroups according to 
the allowable ceilings of regional aid intensity. These ceilings, applicable to investment 
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aid offered in SEZs, are exogenous, as they depend on the level of development of a 
particular voivodeship, in which a given poviat is located (the highest aid ceilings are 
available in the least-developed voivodeships). Therefore, on the basis of the regional 
state aid map for Poland, we take into account relative regional development level in 
voivodeship (NUTS 2) where a given poviat is located. Then, we applied the 3-point 
regional development scale according to GDP per capita in relation to the EU average in 
2005: a) ≤45%, b) 45%< and ≤60%, c) 60%< and ≤75% (as developed by the European 
Commission for the Regional Aid Map, Guideline 2006). 
Moreover, to ensure that the examined groups of poviats identically respond to 
the inflow of investments to SEZs and are identical in terms of socio-economic growth, 
we distinguished subgroups of poviats, taking into account their relative regional 
development (since GDP data for NUTS 4 – poviats - were not available, we used data 
for NUTS 3 - sub-regions- treating them as approximate to the real-life situation in 
poviats). Then we applied the 3-point regional development scale according to GDP per 
capita in relation to the EU average in 2005: a) ≤45%, b) 45%< and ≤60%, c) 60%< and 
≤75%. 
The aforementioned distinctions and classifications were not sufficient to 
evaluate the real impact of SEZs upon the development of poviats because the effects of 
SEZs may also depend on the intensity of investment into SEZs. Hence, the 
classification of poviats in the experimental (treatment) group was expanded by using 
the value of investment in SEZs compared to the gross value of fixed assets in 
individual poviats. Taking this indicator into account, we continued disaggregation and 
identified three subgroups within the experimental (treatment) group of poviats, where 
SEZs investment intensity ranged, respectively: a) ≤5%, b) 5%< and ≤20%, c) >20%. 
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Finally, on the basis of these divisions, for each group (experimental and 
control) we identified seven categories of poviats in Poland (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Categories of poviats, depending on regional development level of 
voivodeships in which they are located. 
Voivodeships 
 
GDP per capita 
in relation to 
the EU average 
Poviats 
 
GDP per capita in 
relation to the EU 
average 
Control 
group 
Treatment group 
Total 
Subtotal 
Poviats whose share of SEZs investments 
in gross value of fixed assets ranged 
≤5% 5%< and 
≤20% >20% 
≤4
5%
  
(th
e 
le
as
t 
de
ve
lo
pe
d)
 ≤45%  
the least developed 
(the poorest) 
85 106 65 27 14 191 
45%< and ≤60% 
(less developed) 2 3 1 1 1 5 
45
%
< 
an
d 
≤6
0%
 
 
(le
ss
 d
ev
el
op
ed
) ≤45% 
the least developed 
(the poorest) 
41 56 25 19 12 97 
45%< and ≤60% 
(less developed) 9 19 9 6 4 28 
60%< and ≤75% 
(more developed) 6 9 7 1 1 15 
60
%
< 
an
d 
≤7
5%
  
(m
or
e 
de
ve
lo
pe
d)
 ≤45% 
the least developed 
(the poorest) 
15 10 5 5 0 25 
45%< and ≤60% 
(less developed) 7 8 6 1 1 15 
Total (category of all-poviats) 165 211 118 60 33 376 
Source: own calculations. 
Our study covers the entire population of poviats in Poland, giving us 376 
territorial units in our samplei. By selecting the treatment and control groups of regions, 
we divided poviats first into two categories composed, respectively, of 211 and 165 
units of territorial statistics. Secondly, they were divided into seven proposed socio-
economic categories, which reduced the membership (population) of respective 
subgroups. Thirdly, by additionally considering the investment intensity of SEZs we 
managed, on one hand, to estimate the impact of this indicator upon our various metrics. 
To this end, we analysed investments in SEZs average intensity measured by the share 
of the total (cumulated) value of investments in SEZs at the end of a given year in gross 
value of fixed assets in companies, in selected categories of poviats in the period 2005-
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2013 (Table 2). This period also allowed us to examine not only investments in zones 
after Poland’s EU accession but also earlier projects dating back to the beginnings of the 
SEZs. 
As Table 2 shows, the intensity of investments in SEZs relative to Gross Value 
of Fixed Assets in a given region was the highest in the least and less-developed poviats 
situated in the least and less-developed voivodeships. Simultaneously, the more-
developed poviats from both less- and better-developed voivodeships see a much lower 
share of SEZs investments in GVFA. This effect is separate from the larger absolute 
values of SEZs investments in the poorer parts of Poland, where state aid ceilings were 
relatively higher, but appears to be instead a result of much lower original total 
investments in poorer regions (i.e. a convergence effect). Taking this into account, we 
can expect that higher SEZ investment intensity, recorded in the lagging regions with 
the highest admissible state aid ceilings, correlated with greater expected impacts on 
value added and also on overall regional development. 
 
Table 2. The differences in changes of certain indicators between categories of poviats 
with and without SEZs in the period of 2005-2013. 
Voivodeships 
GDP per capita in relation 
to the EU average 
Poviats 
GDP per capita in relation to the EU average 
Share of investments in SEZs in the total 
gross value of fixed assets (%) 
≤45% ≤45%  7.6 
45%< and ≤60% 13.6 
45%< and ≤60% 
≤45% 12.5 
45%< and ≤60% 9.4 
60%< and ≤75% 4.6 
60%< and ≤75% ≤45% 5.9 45%< and ≤60% 5.3 
Explanatory notes: 
Source: Own calculations. 
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The actual analysis of the impact of SEZs on regional development was carried 
out using a double difference (difference-in-difference) method of evaluation for each 
region, deducting the difference in the outcome before and after the intervention in the 
control group from the same difference in the experimental group. In this manner, we 
are able to approximate the impact of the SEZ across the metrics of interest (European 
Commission 2014, Gertler et al. 2011, pp. 95-96). 
The benefits of the counterfactual method are legion for an examination such 
as this. In the first instance, this approach has previously been adopted by researchers as 
an accepted component of many evaluation programs concerning public interventions, 
including those run by the government (Heckman and Hotz, 1989:862, Trzciński, 
2009:11-12). For our purposes, the method allows for the assignment of outcomes, 
effects, and consequences of SEZs and, by the same token, verify the accomplishment 
of goals assumed for SEZs in Poland (on which our three detailed hypotheses are 
based).  
The method also has the benefit of avoiding an issue which plagued earlier 
research, mainly a focus on absolute effects of investment in SEZs in terms of capital 
inflow and job creation in zones and not the impact of SEZs per se. Indeed, some of the 
outcomes studied in the earlier work reflect overall economic and social changes, 
including those caused by factors other than SEZs, rather than focusing on direct effects 
of the zones (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008, Ernst and Young 2011, Pastusiak, 2011, 
KPMG 2012, Siudak and Wątorek, 2013, Typa, 2013, Hajduga, 2014). The 
counterfactual method ignores (a) the effects of external factors, which affect regions 
covered by the research; and (b) characteristics which are irrelevant or for which it is 
difficult to make statistical observations.    
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Data 
Data concerning the investment stock in SEZs comes from Polish entrepreneurs who are 
obliged to report their activities in zones to the Ministry of Economy (currently the 
Ministry of Economic Development). Data relating to selected indicators of regional 
development at the poviat level came from the Local Data Bank of the Central 
Statistical Office of Poland (GUS), including gross value of fixed assets (amounts 
involved in purchasing fixed assets or in manufacturing them, without deducting their 
consumption) per entrepreneur, the number of economic operators (including those 
holding SEZ permits), and the unemployment rate. Since these social and economic 
indicators could have been materially influenced by Poland’s EU accession and radical 
modifications of state aid rules with respect to SEZs (Ambroziak, 2009, 2015), the study 
covers nine years, starting with the first full year of the EU membership, i.e. from 2005, 
and runs until 2013. 
 
IMPACT OF INVESTMENTS IN SEZS UPON REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT INDICES 
Gross value of fixed assets per company 
As we have already mentioned, one of the measures of the impact of special economic 
zones upon regional development of poviats is the change in the gross value of fixed 
assets (GVFA) per company. In accordance New Economic Geography theory, we 
assume that the inflow of capital into a SEZ in a given region triggers the interest of 
other investors, creating an agglomeration process. In order to estimate the impact of 
investment in SEZs on GVFA in poviats in Poland, we compared the ratio of average 
GVFA per company in 2013 to that of 2005 in (a) poviats in the experimental group 
(with SEZs); and (b) in poviats in the control group (without SEZs). These ratios were 
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further broken down by levels of regional development (calculated as GDP per capita in 
relation to the EU average) and, in the case of the experimental group, also by the 
investment intensity of SEZs in poviats.ii 
In the period covered by the study, we find in general poviats which recorded 
significant SEZ investment intensities (above 5% of GVFA) exhibited a statistically 
significant increase in the gross value of fixed assets per company (Table 3.). On the 
other hand, taking into account the regional development of both poviats and 
voivodeships in which poviats are located, we found that the differences between 
changes in GVFA in poviats with and without SEZs were statistically insignificant at 
the 5% level. 
However, we need to note two additional tendencies. As could be expected, 
poviats where SEZ investment intensity was above 5% of GVFA recorded a higher 
increase in GVFA per company while those with a very low rate of SEZ investment 
noted an even lower increase in GVFA per company than in poviats without SEZs. 
Secondly, taking into account regional domestic product per capita in relation to the EU 
average, the largest increases in GVFA per company in the experimental group, in 
comparison to the control group, was observed in all categories of poviats from the 
least-developed voivodeships and the poorest ones from less-developed voivodeships. 
 
Table 3. Change in the gross value of fixed assets per company in poviats with SEZs by 
categories compared to poviats without SEZs in 2005-2013 (in percentage points). 
Voivodeships 
GDP per capita in relation to 
the EU average 
Poviats 
GDP per capita in relation to the 
EU average 
Poviats whose share of SEZs investments in gross 
value of fixed assets is: 
Total <=5% >5 and <=20% >20% 
≤45% ≤45%  9.64 -9.29 31.30** 6.90 
45%< and ≤60% 51.49 11.47 -10.76 153.74 
45%< and ≤60% 
≤45% 10.53 2.87 13.15 15.58 
45%< and ≤60% -3.93 -30.98 9.53 9.64 
60%< and ≤75% -5.01 -27.4 -2.17 14.54 
60%< and ≤75% ≤45% -1.08 -0.44 -1.72 n.a. 
45%< and ≤60% 5.11 -4.46 -27.94 47.74 
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All-poviats category 7.87 -9.26 17.86** 15.01** 
Explanatory notes: 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Due to large differences in numbers between certain categories of 
poviats, as well as small populations in certain categories, two tests were performed: both the parametric 
(Student's t-test) and nonparametric (Mann-Whitney U test), in order to capture statistical significance. 
Results of both tests have led us to the same conclusion. 
The higher the positive values, the larger the positive changes with respect to the indices in poviats with 
SEZs in comparison to those without SEZs; while the higher the negative values, the smaller the positive 
changes in indices of territorial units with SEZs than in poviats without SEZs. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Therefore, it appears that investments in SEZs might have a positive impact on 
the increase in overall value of investments per capita in a region, especially in 
relatively poorer ones where the original investment stock was lower in comparison to 
better developed areas. Remaining cautious about the statistical significance of these 
results, they nonetheless may confirm the thesis that SEZs had an impact on the 
geography of capital concentration, increasing GVFA per capita in lagging regions. 
Nonetheless, there is no statistically significant evidence that SEZs have led to 
important increases in investment stocks in regions where they were located. Firstly, 
positive changes in GVFA per company observed in poorer regions in comparison to 
richer ones may only show a dramatically lower value of capital per company in lagging 
areas compared to more-developed ones. Secondly, it seems that investments in SEZs in 
more developed areas, where existing investment stock was much higher than in poorer 
areas, were too low to have any impact on a change in GVFA per company. Thirdly, we 
should also bear in mind that some SEZ investments might be made regardless of the 
existence of SEZs, especially by Polish small and medium-sized companies originating 
from less developed regions. In those cases, SEZs did not attract new investors but only 
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offered tax breaks to entrepreneurs, who would otherwise have invested in given areas. 
In reality, it appears that SEZs did not produce any significant and noticeable 
agglomeration of firms within and outside of zones in terms of GVFA per company, 
regardless of the regional development of regions with SEZs. 
 
The number of economic operators 
In accordance with the concept of business agglomeration proposed by NEG theory, we 
should expect that the inflow of capital into SEZs would be accompanied by an 
expansion of the business community. This assumption applies not only to new 
investors in SEZs but also to entrepreneurs who are external to the zones, who may 
consider moving to an area with a zone due to its attractive incentives. To this end, we 
compared the ratio of the number of economic operators in 2013 to that of 2005 in (a) 
poviats in the experimental group (with SEZs); and (b) poviats in the control group 
(without SEZs), further disaggregated by level of regional development (calculated as 
GDP per capita in relation to the EU average) and, in the case of the experimental 
group, also by the investment intensity in SEZs within the poviat. 
As seen in Table 4, it appears that differences in the size of the business 
community between the categories of all-poviats with and without SEZs were 
statistically insignificant at the 10% level, with one exception, the category of all-
poviats with SEZs investment intensity between 5-20% of GVFA. In this category, we 
observed that poviats with SEZs reported smaller increases in the number of economic 
entities in comparison to those without SEZs. 
Other effects can be seen in poviats with the highest intensity of investment in 
SEZs in relation to GVFA; those with intensities above 20% actually had an adverse 
effect on the increase in the number of economic operators in comparison to poviats 
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without SEZs. This same effect is observed across poviats of all levels of regional 
development, with only one exception (less-developed poviats from less-developed 
voivodeships), recording an overall lower growth rate of economic operators in poviats 
in the treatment group compared to the control group. 
 
Table 4. Change in the number of economic operators in poviats with SEZs by 
categories compared to poviats without SEZs in the period 2005-2013 (in percentage 
points). 
Voivodeships 
GDP per capita in relation to 
the EU average 
Poviats 
GDP per capita in relation to the 
EU average 
Poviats whose share of SEZs investments in gross 
value of fixed assets is: 
Total <=5% >5 and <=20% >20% 
≤45% ≤45%  -2.3 0.74 -4.58 -2.94 
45%< and ≤60% -8.9 -28.37 -26.81 28.42 
45%< and ≤60% 
≤45% -3.1 -2.96 -4.76 -1.51 
45%< and ≤60% 6.3 9.17 7.06 2.71 
60%< and ≤75% -0.4 7.56 -6.68 -2.18 
60%< and ≤75% ≤45% -2.7 3.63 -9.11 n.a. 
45%< and ≤60% -2.2 -1.99 6.41 -11.15 
All-poviats category -1.31 0.57 -3.94* -0.55 
Explanatory notes: 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Due to large differences in numbers between certain categories of 
poviats, as well as small populations in certain categories, two tests were performed: both the parametric 
(Student's t-test) and nonparametric (Mann-Whitney U test), in order to capture statistical significance. 
Results of both tests have led us to the same conclusion. 
The higher the positive values, the larger the positive changes with respect to the indices in poviats with 
SEZs in comparison to those without SEZs; while the higher the negative values, the smaller the positive 
changes in indices of territorial units with SEZs than in poviats without SEZs. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Given these results, we can conclude that capital inflow into SEZs did not 
produce a higher increase in numbers of economic entities compared to regions without 
SEZs. Indeed, it appears that the presence of SEZs rather discouraged entrepreneurs 
from locating their investments in poviats close to zones, with the exception of those 
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who decided to base themselves within the SEZs. In a reversal of NEG theory, SEZs in 
Poland instead triggered anti-agglomeration processes in their immediate region or 
vicinity.   
The reason behind this result can be traced to SEZ activities which may be 
detrimental to competition in the local market. Firms located in SEZs usually continue 
their business relations with co-operators and suppliers established before they started to 
operate in SEZs, eschewing links with new companies in favour of pre-existing ones.  
Thus, potential local co-operators, subcontractors and service-providers do not see an 
increase in business, benefits from enhanced economic activity do not increase, and thus 
other companies are not attracted to and operate in a given area outside SEZs. On top of 
these effects, new investors in SEZs, who enjoy tax breaks, are also much more 
competitive in terms of costs in comparison to existing local companies. This allows 
them to inter alia, (slightly) increase salaries, improve working conditions, and, on the 
basis of ‘novelty and freshness effect’, take over well-qualified employees from existing 
companies. As a result, local firms struggle with labour force scarcity, higher 
competitiveness of new investors from SEZs and a more favourable attitude of local 
authorities towards big, often foreign companies, offering new jobs. Such circumstances 
conspire to discourage existing and potential new companies to operate close to SEZs.  
Of course, all of these phenomena also occur external to any individual operator, 
and so each firm interested in using an SEZ only sees maximization in terms of the 
short-term benefits which accrue from the zone, including legal certainty and economies 
of scale from being located in a given area with other companies. Therefore, there may 
still be agglomeration processes taking place, but there is no evidence by this metric 
(number of economic operators) for such an effect.  
 
20 
Unemployment rate 
Finally, the reduction of unemployment in the regions was one of the key reasons 
behind the establishment of special economic zones in Poland. Polish authorities 
assumed that by establishing SEZs they would attract entrepreneurs to selected areas, 
increase investment inflow into these same poviats, and increase the number of new 
jobs, mitigating social tensions on the labour market. As with the other metrics, we test 
whether this goal was accomplished via an assessment of changes in the unemployment 
rate in each poviat in 2013 compared to 2005. The comparison covered: (a) poviats in 
the experimental group (with SEZs); and (b) poviats in the control group (without 
SEZs), further disaggregated by levels of regional development (calculated as GDP per 
capita in relation to the EU average) and, in the case of the experimental group, also by 
the SEZs investment intensity in poviats. 
On the basis of this examination, we can see that the unemployment rate was 
reduced to a higher extent in poviats with SEZs than in those without SEZs (Table 5), 
with strong correlations between higher SEZ investment intensity (above 5%) and 
higher reductions in unemployment. Taking into account the effects of regional 
development, we also may see that investments in SEZs in the poorest poviats (from the 
least- and less-developed voivodeships) had the biggest effect on the reduction of 
unemployment (compared to poviats without SEZs). 
 
Table 5. Change in the unemployment rate in poviats with SEZs by categories compared 
to poviats without SEZs in the period 2005-2013 (in percentage points). 
Voivodeships 
GDP per capita in relation to 
the EU average 
Poviats 
GDP per capita in relation to the 
EU average 
Poviats whose share of SEZs investments in gross 
value of fixed assets is: 
Total <=5% >5 and <=20% >20% 
≤45% ≤45%  1.66*** 1.13** 1.65*** 2.20*** 
45%< and ≤60% 0.72 -1.85 0.25 3.75 
45%< and ≤60% ≤45% 1.51** 0.65 1.56* 2.32* 
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45%< and ≤60% 0.77 0.13 2.17 0.02 
60%< and ≤75% 0.41 -1.83 3.48 -0.42 
60%< and ≤75% ≤45% 1.83 1.53 2.13 n.a. 
45%< and ≤60% 1.94 0.57 1.97 3.27 
All-poviats category -1.31 1.72*** 0.67* 1.99*** 
Explanatory notes: 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Due to large differences in numbers between certain categories of 
poviats, as well as small populations in certain categories, two tests were performed: both the parametric 
(Student's t-test) and nonparametric (Mann-Whitney U test), in order to capture statistical significance. 
Results of both tests have led us to the same conclusion. 
The higher the positive values, the larger the positive changes with respect to the indices in poviats with 
SEZs in comparison to those without SEZs; while the higher the negative values, the smaller the positive 
changes in indices of territorial units with SEZs than in poviats without SEZs. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
These outcomes of SEZ activities in the labour market can partially confirm the 
hypothesis that capital inflow into SEZs decreases unemployment in the least developed 
regions (less-developed regions are statistically insignificant). Since relations between 
companies from and outside of SEZs in a given region are rather weak, it seems that an 
important improvement in the labour local market derives from the creation of new jobs 
by investors in SEZs. This phenomenon confirms an agglomeration process launched by 
SEZs, but concentrated only within zones and due to investments made by large 
companies based out of a different region. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has examined the effect that SEZs have had on regional development in 
Poland across a broad range of metrics. We hypothesized that increased investment into 
SEZs should be correlated with higher gross value of fixed assets per company in the 
region (H1), more business entities (H2), and a reduction in the regional unemployment 
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(H3). Our analysis showed that SEZs did indeed boost the overall economic and social 
development in Polish regions, but this relationship was contingent on poviat-specific 
factors. In particular, SEZs were associated with a higher increase in the gross value of 
fixed assets per company in comparison to regions without an SEZ, but only in the 
least- and lesser-developed poviats. However, the number of economic entities in 
regions with SEZs was statistically insignificant compared to those that had no SEZs, 
suggesting that the zone approach was not effective in improving a region’s overall 
investment attractiveness. Finally, as regards the labour market, it appeared that SEZs 
were effective in lowering the unemployment rate in the most-lagging regions, an 
important point given that this was the main driver of the SEZ policy in Poland. 
On balance, thus, it appears that SEZs had a mostly favourable impact on 
regional socio-economic indices in Poland, but these results were dependent upon both 
the development level of the targeted poviat and how committed the local authorities 
were to invest in the SEZ. Moreover, once we consider that unemployment rates fell 
even though the number of economic operators did not grow at an abnormal pace, it 
appears that SEZs encouraged an agglomeration process, producing new jobs but only 
in a select few (mainly large) companies. 
Of course, these successes must be balanced against the possible inefficiencies 
of SEZs as a tool of regional development, including the fact that offering tax allowance 
and/or other financial and administrative preferences can disturb competition and distort 
local markets. Indeed, while such incentives may attract investors, our results in the 
Polish case show that the benefits accrued only to the SEZ itself and not to the greater 
region where the SEZ was established. Moreover, as economic zones are open to all 
entrepreneurs and companies originating from the same country or region (unlike export 
processing zones), the incentive to invest within the region of the SEZ was diluted; in 
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reality, firms could run their economic activities within a zone but still invest outside of 
the SEZ, preferably in their home region. This was the case in Poland, as investors in 
zones continued to maintain contacts with suppliers and direct wholesalers established 
previously, providing no stimulation to the local market. 
The policy ramifications of the Polish experience reinforce basic economic 
tenets, mainly that large marginal gains can accrue from investment in less-developed 
regions. For countries seeking to stimulate regional development, SEZs may provide 
some benefit if targeted to poorer regions, but even then, the SEZ must be properly 
structured in order to keep investment within the region and avoid leakage across the 
country (as in Poland). Additionally, in order to mitigate negative consequences for 
competition within the region, SEZs should be used in complement with other public 
interventions aimed at improving regional development, ensuring that SEZs encourage 
building new linkages rather than assisting market-based agglomeration process of 
companies. In this regard, further research is needed on optimal policies of assistance 
and the development of regions which hold SEZs. 
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i It should be noted that there were 380 national units of the territorial statistics NUTS 4 (poviats) in 
Poland from the beginning of 2012, however we excluded some of them due to the fact that: a) the city of 
Wałbrzych belonged to the wałbrzyski poviat until the end of 2012 and only in 2013 did it become a 
separate Wałbrzych poviat, thus in order to ensure the comparability of outcomes, we decided to add data 
concerning Wałbrzych to data on the wałbrzyski poviat in 2013, b) three poviats (the richest cities: 
Warsaw, Poznań and Kraków) represented three individual cases in three separate categories therefore no 
comparative analysis was feasible. 
ii However, conclusions based on investment intensity should be viewed with caution due to a small 
number of poviats in certain subgroups of the ‘less’ and ‘more’ developed units, in contrast to the ‘least’ 
developed poviats 
